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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a), this matter involving a final order resulting
from adjudicative proceedings of the Division of Peace Officer
Standards and Training, Department of Public Safety.

Jurisdiction

is also based on Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Utah
Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-12 and 63-46b-14 and Utah Administrative Code
§ R728-409-23.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether agency staff can dismiss, on the merits, a citizen

complaint initiating formal adjudicative proceedings, without
requiring an answer, without hearing, without taking evidence and
without entering findings of fact and conclusions of law and
without a decision on the merits by a "presiding officer."
2.

Whether findings by a district court judge that a peace

officer acted without probable cause, and filed statements under
oath which were "riddled with untruths" may be ignored or reversed
in agency proceedings within the limits of the doctrines res
judicata, collateral estoppel and law of the case.
3.

Whether adjudicated perjury, and uncontrovertible falsi-

fication of public documents, must be referred by the agency to
the appropriate prosecutorial authority.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
On review of an order dismissing a complaint, this Court
accepts the material allegations of the complaint as true and
affirms only if the facts alleged fail to state a claim for which

relief can be granted.
(Utah 1991); St.

Prows v. State,

Benedict's

175 Utah Adv. Rep. 6

Dev. Co. v. St.

811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Coleman

v.

Benedict's

Utah State

Hospital,

Land Board,

795

P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
When reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of
general law, this court applies a correction of error standard of
review, giving no deference to the agency's interpretation.
re Topik,
Admin.

761 P.2d 32 (Utah App. 1988) citing Department

Servs.

v. Public

Serv.

Comm'n,

In

of

658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah

1983) .
On review of a summary judgment, this Court accords no
deference to rulings on either the facts or the law and every
burden is on the appellee.

An appellate court

consider[s] the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and affirm[s]
only where it appears there is no genuine
dispute as to any material issues of fact, or
where, even according the facts as contended by
the losing party, the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Themy v.
Seagull

Enters.,

Inc.,

595 P.2d 626, 628-29

(Utah 1979).
Accord.,

Wycalis

v.

Guardian

1989); Barber

v. Farmers

1988); Briggs

v. Holcomb,

Ins.

Title,

Exch.,

780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah App.

751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App.

740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah App. 1987).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This case involves construction of the following provision of
the Peace Officer Training Code, Utah Code Ann. § 67-15-2.1:
The Division of Peace Officer Standards and
Training shall comply with the procedures and
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its
adjudicative proceedings.
2

and the following provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et. seq.):
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(l), effective April 1,
1992:
. . . except as otherwise provided by a statute
superseding provisions of this chapter by
explicit reference to this chapter, the
provisions of this chapter apply to every agency
of the state of Utah and govern:
(a) all state agency actions that determine the
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or
other legal interests of one or more identifiable
persons, including all agency actions to grant,
deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw or
amend an authority, right, or license . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4) concerning summary disposition:
(4) This chapter does not preclude . . .
the presiding officer during an adjudicative
proceeding from:
*

•

*

(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56,
respectively, of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are met by the moving party,
except to the extent that the requirements of those rules are modified by
this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(1)(h)(i), defining "presiding
officer":
Presiding officer means an agency head, or an
individual or body of individuals designated
by the agency head, by the agency's rules, or
by statute to conduct an adjudicative
proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a) permitting initiation of
adjudicative proceedings by Complaint:
Where the law applicable to the agency permits
persons other than the agency to initiate
adjudicative proceedings, that person's request
3

for agency action shall be in writing and
signed by the person invoking the jurisdiction
of the agency, or by his representative, and
shall include:
(i) the names and addresses of all persons to
whom a copy of the request for agency action is
being sent;
(ii) the agency's file number or other
reference number, if known;
(iii) the date that the request for agency
action was mailed;
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which agency action is
requested;
(v) a statement of the relief or action
sought from the agency, and
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons
forming the basis for relief or agency action.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d) requiring notice in adjudicative

A
proceedings:
^ '
The presiding officer shall promptly review a
request for agency action and shall:
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that
the request is granted and that the adjudicative
proceeding is completed;
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing
that the request is denied and, if the proceeding
is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that the
party may request a hearing before the agency to
challenge the denial; or
(iii) notify the requesting party that further
proceedings are required to determine the
agency's response to the request.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-3v(e) and 63-46b-5 (1) (i) defining the
contents of notice of denial of adjudicative proceedings:
(i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii)
shall contain the information required by
Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to
disclosure required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) of
this section.
•

*

*

*

Within a reasonable time after the close of an
informal adjudicative proceeding [or denial of
a formal proceeding under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-3(d)(ii)], the presiding officer shall
4

issue a signed order in writing that states the
following:
(i) the decision;
(ii) the reasons for the decision;
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative
or judicial review available to the parties; and
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or
requesting a review.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8T requiring due process and basic
fairness:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure
of relevant facts and to afford all the parties
reasonable opportunity to present their
positions.
and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 providing for judicial review:
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial
review of final agency action. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises out of Respondent, Dale Gurley ("Gurley"
herein), a peace officer, conducting an illegal search and seizure
of Appellant's property, then preparing false reports of his
conduct to give it an appearance of propriety and filing a false
statement under oath with the Third District Court for Tooele
County to conceal the wrongfulness of his conduct; and the refusal
of Respondent, Division of Peace Officer Standards and Training
("POST") to (1) hold hearings on Gurley's conduct, allow
Petitioner to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, (2)
discipline Gurley, and/or (3) refer his perjury to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities.
A.

Course of Proceedings.
Appellant filed a Complaint with POST on September 3, 1991,
5

containing, seriatim, all of the elements required by Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a).

The Complaint was pursuant to Utah

Administrative Code § R728-409-5B-6,^

permitting a citizen to

file a "complaint . . . which on its face appears to [state] a
violation of section 409-3 [viz., states misconduct by a peace
officer which would reflect badly on law enforcement]."
B.

Disposition by POST.
No notice was issued by POST pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-46b-3»(e) (iii) requiring Gurley to answer, or granting
Petitioner's request for a hearing.

Instead of requiring an

answer, the Director of POST and its Certification Bureau Chief
issued a letter (the "Order" herein) on May 6, 1992, the effect of
which was either to dismiss the complaint or grant summary
judgment on all factual and legal questions in Gurley's favor.
The letter of POST at R. 0250 declares, unequivocally, that "the
decision of POST [is] to close this case with no action to be
taken."
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration,
demanding a hearing and asserting that the Order was an improper
adjudication of facts under the Administrative Procedures Act and
the Administrative Code, that the Order failed to include findings
and conclusions or a right of appeal and that the procedure
followed denied due process, including the right to present
evidence.

The motion for reconsideration was deemed denied under

1
Thc Complaint was pursuant to Utah Administrative Coda | R715-409-5B-6, as in effect in
1991, which has been redesignated f R728-409-5B-6 (1992), but is unchanged. For convenience,
and to avoid confusion, references vill be to the current numbering.
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provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) on June 3, 1992, by
reason of POST failing to act thereon in any way.

Petition for

Writ of Review was filed on June 4, 1992.
C.

Proceedings Herein.
Respondent Gurley moved for summary disposition on the theory

that there was no "final order" on July 2, 1992, which motion was
denied by order of the Honorable Norman H. Jackson on October 13,
1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts alleged in the Verified Complaint-' have
not been denied or controverted.
On September 8, 1990, Gurley forcibly entered a locked bird
pen belonging to Petitioner, which was part of a licensed game
farm associated with property leased by Petitioner, together with
Messrs. Leslie Foote and Roy N. Byrd, pursuant to Special Use
Lease Agreement No. 798 with the State of Utah, Division of State
Lands and Forestry, released or took live Chukar, purchased from a
licensed game farm, game bird feeders, game bird feed, bands
purchased from DWR, and watering devices, rendering the premises
unusable as a private wildlife farm.
R. 0017.)

(Complaint R. 0037, Ex. A at

Gurley made no arrest of Petitioner, including by

issuance of any citation for any alleged violation of law and
obtained no warrant for the search of the premises or seizure of

The Verified Complaint was not indexed in the Record prepared by POST, but appears at
R. 0034, following exhibits to the Complaint vhich are out of order but appear at R. 0011
through R. 0033. The allegations of the Verified Complaint are under oath, and its exhibits
consist of verified documents and orders of the Third District Court. The Verified Complaint
and its exhibits are thus uncontroverted facts herein.
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any property therein on September 8, 1990, or at any time prior
thereto or thereafter.

(Complaint R. 0037, Ex. D at R. 0067.)

Gurley knew, however, that the bird pen "belonged to 'Parker the
dog trainer' who was an attorney," that his name was Parker
Nielson and that he lived in Salt Lake City, and that "Parker the
dog trainer" was staying in "a trailer behind the Vernon store,"
having been informed of those facts by both Douglas Larson and
Charlie Larson, cattle ranchers operating the same lands leased by
Petitioner.

(Complaint R. 0037, admitted in Gurley's report at R.

0004.)
Petitioner and his co-lessees, acting by and through Leslie
Foote, held a Certificate of Registration for a Private Wildlife
Farm issued by DWR, No. PWF-SLO-129, at T.9S., R.6W., SLB&M, Sec.
15, 16, 22, Tooele Co., inclusive of the lands embraced by Lease
No. 798.

(Complaint R. 0038, Ex. A at R. 0012.)

Said lease and

said wildlife farm permit were issued for the specific purpose of
"releasing and propagating gamebirds for hunting dog training and
conducting non-commercial competition of hunting dogs."
(Complaint R. 0038, Ex. A at R. 0013.)

During the entire time

alleged Petitioner had in his possession copies of the permit and
a bill of sale documenting the purchase of the live game birds
from a lawful source and Gurley has admitted that copies of the
permit were available to him at his office.

(Complaint R. 0038,

Ex. A at R. 0016.)
Gurley knew that it was lawful to possess live game birds
pursuant to a Certificate of Registration and to use them for dog
training, but made no request that Petitioner exhibit any
8

documentation or authority.
at Ex. D at R. 0067)

(Complaint R. 0038, Ex. A at R. 0017

Petitioner was well known to Gurley since

1986 and an Affidavit was filed with POST establishing that Gurley
had pursued a campaign to interfere with all dog training
activities, those of Petitioner in particular, since 1986.

(See

Complaint R. 0042 and Affidavit of Deputy Sheriff Dan Taylor
reciting Gurley's threats to do so at R. 0085.)
Petitioner discovered that Gurley had destroyed the bird pen
and taken his property four days later, on September 12, 1990 and
initiated civil suit against Gurley.

(R. 0039 and copy of the

Verified Complaint at R. 0011.)
Gurley made no report of his destruction of Petitioner's bird
pen and taking of his property, and gave Petitioner no notice of
his conduct or any claim that it was pursuant to law enforcement
authority until after the civil suit was initiated.

(R. 0039.)

Upon being served with process, Gurley embarked on a pattern of
conduct involving falsification of documents and perjury in an
effort to conceal his wrongful conduct.
investigative report.

(R. 0039.)

Gurley backdated an

Although it is dated September

8, 1990, the "report" bears Petitioner's office address, which
Gurley admitted he copied from the summons served on him on
September 13, 1990, and refers to "release of purchased Chukars,"
although Gurley claimed that he believed the birds were "wild"
until being served with process.

Gurley's Affidavit reveals,

conclusively, that the report was backdated as follows:
I did not finalize my report on the bird [pen]
until September 13, 1990, when I was served
with a Summons in this lawsuit. Prior to that
9

date I had made field notes of my investigation
and made sketches of the bird [pen]. I
finalized my report on September 13, 1990,
because I learned, through the service of the
Summons on me, that Plaintiff was the one who
owned the bird fpen]." (Emphasis added.)
(R. 0039.)
In a further effort to conceal his wrongful conduct, Gurley
fabricated, forged or falsified a "citation" against Petitioner
and attached it to his Affidavit, stating under oath, that "I
issued a citation to Plaintiff on or about September 13, 1990 by
mailing it to him."

(R. 0040.)

No citation was ever issued and

the fabricated document was never mailed to Petitioner.

It is

conclusive that the citation is a fabrication, or forgery, because
Gurley had previously statedr under oath in Answers filed with the
Court on on October 22, 1990, copies of which are attached to the
Complaint, that he "made no arrest of Plaintiff, including by
issuance of any citation for any alleged violation of law, on
September 8, 1990, or at any time thereafter . . . "

(R. 0040.

See also Exhibit "D" to the Complaint, Response to Request No. 7
at R. 0067.)

It is conclusive that the fabricated "citation" was

never "issued," for the certificate of the Clerk of the Circuit
Court for Tooele County establishes that no such "citation" was
ever filed with the Court.
Ex. E at R. 0106.)

(R. 0040.

The Clerk's certificate is

Moreover, Gurley's sworn Affidavit quoted

above confirms that he prepared it after service of summons on
him.

(R. 0040.)

Gurley himself admitted in his Answers to

Plaintiff's Fourth Request for Admissions by Gurley dated November
1, 1991, that the "citation" attached to said Affidavit dated
April 18, 1991, was in fact spurious, and without any validity or
10

effect (See answer to Request for Admission No. 6 at R. 0177-0178)
and admitted to POST at R. 0244 that he never had any intent to
issue a citation.
Partial Summary Judgment was entered against Gurley by the
Honorable David S. Young on June 24, 1991, a copy of which is
attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B".

(R. 0099-0104.)

Judge

Young held that Gurley acted without probable cause and that his
conduct was unlawful.

(R. 0103.)

Judge Young also held that

Petitioner's conduct was lawful and that the proper procedure for
a law enforcement officer was to request any person found in
possession of live game birds to show his authority.

The

Honorable Richard H. Moffat granted Appellant's Motion to Strike
Gurley's false Affidavit, holding that "it is clear that the
Gurley document is riddled with untruths." Judge Moffat's minute
entry (R. 0216) and his formal order (R. 0235-0237) were both
filed with POST, in support of the Complaint, and copies are
attached hereto.
Gurley made other false statements, under oath, in an effort
to conceal that he destroyed crucial evidence in disregard of his
obligations as a law enforcement officer.-'

No argument is made

herein about the numerous other "untruths" found by Judge Moffat,
for the matter of the citation, being based on uncontrovertible
documentary evidence, adequately establishes the perjury.

"* Gurley'* statement to POST at R. 0244-0247 reveals additional false statements in the
Affidavit, details of vhich are explained at footnote 5 on p. 24.

li

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Peace Officer Training Code and regulations thereunder,
together with the Administrative Procedures Act which it
implements and adopts, provide for five levels or stages for
processing any question of peace officer misconduct:

(1)

allegation of misconduct, (2) investigation, (3) formulation of
the claim or charge, (4) adjudication and (5) appeal.
At the first stage, the allegation of "grounds for refusal,
suspension or revocation of certification" may be informal, from
"any responsible source" under Utah Administrative Code
§ R728-409-3, or by formal charge of misconduct by citizen
complaint under Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-5.
At the second stage, the allegation of grounds is investigated
by a "staff member" under Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-5E.
It is important to observe that the investigation is the only
function assigned to staff, and that staff is limited to "makfinal
a recommendation to proceed or discontinue action in the matter."
Id.

Any decision, including any decision to discontinue action,

must be made by the "presiding officer" or the Council on Peace
Officer Standards and Training ("Council" herein).
The third stage, the charge, occurs in one of two ways,
depending on how the proceeding was initiated.
(a)

If the proceeding originated by a staff investigation, a

notice of agency action is issued on "reasonable belief that cause
exists for the refusal, suspension or revokation of peace officer
. . . certification."

Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-5A.

A

notice of agency action and administrative complaint is issued in
12

t h a t event under Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-8 and Utah
Code Ann. § 6 3 - 4 6 b - 3 ( 2 ) M
(b)

I f t h e a c t i o n i s i n i t i a t e d by a c i t i z e n complaint under

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3) and Utah Administrative Code
§ R728-409-5B6, t h e r e must be a statement served on t h e respondent
o f f i c e r s e t t i n g out t h e f a c t s , l e g a l a u t h o r i t y and other p e r t i n e n t
information and statement of the r e l i e f sought.

In t h a t event the

p r e s i d i n g o f f i c e r must conduct a hearing on t h e m e r i t s of the
C3)
Complaint pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3 l td) and take
e v i d e n c e , or may d i s m i s s the complaint i f i t f a i l s t o s t a t e a
claim or grant a summary judgment under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l(4).

Only t h e "presiding" o f f i c e r may conduct the

hearing, or d i s m i s s the Complaint.

S t a f f has no a u t h o r i t y t o

Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-3(2):
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the following
requirements:
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding
officer, and shall include:
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice is being
given by the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing address of
any attorney or employee who has been designated to appear for the agency;
(li) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed;
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted
informally according to the provisions of rules adopted under Sections
63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the provisions of Sections
63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that each
respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the mailing date of
the notice of agency action;
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is
required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any
scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing is to be
held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or participate in the
hearing may be held in default;
(vlii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing is
required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be
requested by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a statement that the
parties may request a hearing within the time provided by the agency's rules;
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the
adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained;
(x) the name, title, nailing address, and telephone number of the presiding
officeri and
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and, to the
extent known by the presiding officer, the questions to be decided.
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dismiss a complaint or grant summary judgment.
The fourth stage, the trial, was never reached in this case
and this appeal represents the fifth stage, the appeal.
The Order was in error and must be reversed because it was not
by a presiding officer and fails to conform to the requirements of
Rules 12(b) and 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and ignores the
uncontroverted evidence attached to the Complaint.

The Order

further errs in not securing due process, including the right to a
hearing and to cross-examine witnesses, and disregards the orders
of Judges Young and Moffat, which have collateral estoppel
effect.

This Court should, therefore, enter appropriate relief

including directing the entry of findings confirming the
uncontroverted facts adduced by Petitioner and, in particular,
directing reference of Gurley to appropriate prosecutorial
authorities.
A R G U M E N T
The Legislature adopted a new Administrative Procedures Act in
1988 (the "Act" herein), and amended it in 1990, and again in
1991, see Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, et seq, leaving no room for
doubt that it applies to every proceeding before an agency.

If

there could be such doubt, the statute creating POST, Utah Code
Ann. § 67-15-2.2 (quoted supra.) specifically declares that POST
"shall comply with the procedures and requirements of [the
Administrative Procedures Act]."

The Act also makes clear that

there must be due process and fairness at each of five levels of
proceedings, corresponding to proceedings in the judicial
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process:

(1) allegation of misconduct, (2) investigation, (3)

formulation of the claim or charge, (4) adjudication and (5)
appeal.

The Administrative Code thus defines the "anatomy of an

administrative proceeding" corresponding to the anatomy of a civil
or criminal judicial proceeding.

There must be a hearing, if a

hearing is demanded, either on the merits or on an order of
dismissal or for summary judgment.

There is no provision for

termination of a bona fide citizen complaint without affording the
right to a hearing.
The Order herein was plainly a "Final Order."

It disposed of

Petitioner's Complaint and left nothing for further decision.
Cf., Sloan

v. Board of Review,

Accord, Barney

v. Department

781 P.2d 463 (Utah App. 1989).
of Commerce,

183 Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah

App., Mar. 26, 1992).
The fundamental error of POST is that it ignored the
legislatures' plain direction that administrative proceedings
comport with due process including the right to a hearing.

POST

treated the Complaint of Petitioner as it might have done in an
earlier era, when peace officer misconduct was like any other
master-servant relationship, to be dealt with administratively
with unfettered and sometimes arbitrary discretion.
POINT I
THE ACT MANDATES
DUE PROCESS IN AGENCY PROCEEDINGS
The overriding purpose of the Act was to establish due process
and fairness in all agency proceedings.
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A.

Staff May Not Refuse, at the First Level of Proceedings, to
Entertain a Citizen Complaint.
It must be observed, as a first proposition, that both the

Administrative Procedures Act and Utah Administrative Code
§ R728-409-5A give members of the public, who a peace officer must
serve, substantive rights in the disciplinary process.

To that

end, § R728-409-5A provides that, at the first stage of an
administrative proceeding, the action may be initiated in one of
two ways.

Either (1) "[a]11 investigations initiated by the

division of an individual . . . shall be commenced upon the
reasonable belief that cause exists for the refusal, suspension or
revocation of peace officer . . . certification" or (2) the
proceeding will be initiated by a citizen complaint.

Petitioner's

Complaint was pursuant to provisions of paragraph 6, part B, Utah
Administrative Code § R728-409-5 which specifically permit a
citizen to file a "complaint . . . which, on its face, appears to
[state] a violation of section 409-3."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a) provides that "[w]here the law
applicable to the agency permits persons other than the agency to
initiate adjudicative proceedings" they may do so in writing.
Said § 63-46b-3(3)* further declares that, if the agency's rules
permit initiation of a complaint, a "presiding officer" shall
review the complaint and either proceed to hearing or notify the
complainant that the request is denied.
The presiding officer shall promptly review a
request for agency action and shall:
(i) notify the requesting party in writing
that the request is granted and that the
adjudicative proceeding is completed;
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(ii) notify the requesting party in writing
that the request is denied and, if the
proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding,
that the party may request a hearing before the
agency to challenge the denial; or
(iii) notify the requesting party that
further proceedings are required to determine
the agency's response to the request.
Even a denial of the request is subject to a right to a hearing
under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-3v(d) , discussed infra at p. 20-21.
There is, in a word, a right to a hearing in all events, even if
the complaint is dismissed.

There is no requirement of a hearing

by a presiding officer on every informal complaint received by
POST, whether verbal or in writing, but when a citizen initiates a
formal complaint, by conforming to the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)(a), staff has no discretion not to proceed.
Agency rules afford the right to complain, but the statute defines
the elements of a formal complaint and the procedure to be
followed.
B.

Staff Discretion at the Second Level Is Limited to
Investigation.
The second level of the administrative proceeding, the inves-

tigation, does not result from any provision of the Administrative
Procedures Act proper, but from the provisions of Utah
Administrative Code § R728-409-5E that "[a] staff member will be
assigned to investigate the complaint or information and to make a
recommendation to proceed or discontinue action in the matter."
(Emphasis added.)
1.

POST Staff May Only "Investigate.

Neither the statute nor

the Administrative Procedures Act affords POST discretion, and
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surely not arbitrary discretion, not to proceed.

The

"recommendation" at the second, or investigative, level is only
that —

a suggestion to the "presiding officer," much like a peace

officer or investigator would make to a prosecutor or judge.

That

result follows, of necessity, from the following language of Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4):
(4) This chapter does not preclude . . . the
presiding officer during an adjudicative
proceeding from:
*

*

*

(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56,
respectively, of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are met by the moving party,
except to the extent that the requirements of those rules are modified by this
chapter. (Emphasis added.)
Said Section R728-409-5E of the rules is entitled "investigative
procedure" and states that an investigation shall be made upon
"reasonable belief" that cause exists for discipline.
The positive error of the Order herein is evident if it is
observed that the only discretion afforded under the
Administrative Procedures Act was necessarily exercised by
determining that the Complaint did, in fact, state a cause of
action.

That must be so, for the Order reveals that POST did in

fact investigate.

The Order states that the order "is based on a

thorough examination of all the records and documents provided by
yourself, Dale Gurley, and the Attorney General's Office" and that
"in addition to the written information, interviews were conducted
with yourself, Mr. Gurley, the Tooele County Attorney, and the
Attorney General's Office."

The Order thus confirms that the
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"reasonable belief" standard was met.

"Probable cause" was

necessarily resolved against Gurley.
2.

Only a "Presiding Officer" May Dismiss a Complaint.

POST

was thus obligated to proceed to the charging phase, or third
level of proceedings specified at subdivision (d) of Section 3V.
The respondent officer must be required to answer and a "presiding
officer" (usually an administrative law judge) appointed to decide
if the complaint and answer present a claim.
A staff member may conduct an investigation, but only a
"presiding officer" may decide not to proceed and if he does so he
must afford the complainant with reasons for the decision, a right
to a hearing and a right of appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63-46b-3(3)(d) and 63-46b-5(1)(i).

It would be a strange

twist, indeed, if POST could avoid those plain provisions by
simply refusing to assign a file number to a formal complaint and
refusing to require the Respondent to so much as answer.

Due

process, which is required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8, supra.,
would admit of no such ruse.
The "presiding officer" may be the Director or a person or
group of persons so designated by the Director.

Thus Mr. Orr may

have appointed himself the presiding officer, or he may designate
himself and Mr. Morris, the Bureau Chief, to act jointly as the
presiding officer.

In this matter POST has conceded in its motion

to dismiss this appeal that Mr. Orr did not act as a presiding
officer, and that "POST conducted a preliminary investigation . . .
and declined to initiate formal proceedings." Mem. in Support of
Motion for Summary Disposition p. 3.
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POST also concedes that it

"mailed a letter to Petitioner, indicating the decision to take no
action . . ." Id.

(Emphasis added.)

It is important to

recognize, however, that even if Mr. Orr had acted as "presiding
officer" he would have initiated a "formal adjudicative
proceeding" and would have thus proceeded to the third stage of
proceedings.

Thereafter the Administrative Procedures Act

controls the conduct of proceedings.
The first error of the Order is that there is no authority to
dispose of a bona fide complaint at the second or investigative
level.

Even if the Order could be considered at the third, or

charging level, it was nevertheless in error because it fails to
meet the standards of Rule 12(b) or 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3.

(See Point C , infra.)

The Order Herein Exceeded POST/s Discretion.

The Order

cannot be by a "presiding officer" pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-3Y(d) (11) (quoted supra) , even if it be conceded that Mr.
Orr might have designated himself and/or Mr. Morris to act in that
capacity, for it did not afford Petitioner the right to request a
hearing nor did it include the elements of a notice by a presiding
officer defined at Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(i) fviz., it did
not state reasons, or findings, and did not include a right of
administrative or judicial review].

The Order was, necessarily, a

"formal adjudicative proceeding" for the purpose of said
§ 3^)(ii), for there is no provision in the Peace Office
Standards and Training Code, Utah Administrative Code § R728-409,
for informal adjudicative proceedings and Utah Code Ann.
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§ 63-46b-4(2) provides that ". . . all agency adjudicative
proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by
the agency's rules shall be conducted formally in accordance with
the requirements of this chapter.1'
Petitioner called this dilemma to POST'S attention with a
timely motion for rehearing.

POST was requested to declare, in

particular, if the order was a staff decision pursuant to said
code § R728-409-5 or a decision by Director Orr acting as

<£> ..

. . .

"presiding officer" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)(11).
POST was also requested to enter the findings required by the
Act.

Although POST declined to provide this Court with guidance

by defining what the basis for the Order was, we submit that a
careful reading of the Act leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the Order must be at the second, or investigative level. It
must be at the investigative stage, for Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-3f(d) requires a review and a notice by a "presiding
officer," but no presiding officer was ever appointed herein.

It

is therefore in error, for no decision making authority exists at
the investigative stage.
this Court is guided by the principle that
where a "'specific power is conferred by
statute upon a tribunal, board, or commission
with limited powers, the powers are limited to
such as are specifically mentioned.'" Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 103 Utah
186, 197, 134 P.2d 469, 474 (1943) (quoting
Bamberger Elec. R.R. Co. v. Public
Utilities
Comm'n, 59 Utah 351, 364, 204 P. 314, 320
(1922)). All powers retained [by an
administrative agency] are derived from and
created by statute. The [administrative
agency] has no inherent regulatory powers and
can only assert those which are expressly
granted or clearly implied as necessary to the
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discharge of the duties and responsibilities
imposed upon it. Basin Flying Serv. v.
Public
Serv. Comm'n, 531 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah
1975). To ensure that the administrative
powers . . • are not overextended, "any
reasonable doubt of the existence of anv power
must be resolved against the exercise
thereof." Public Serv. Comm'n v. Formal
Complaint of VfWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183, 186 (Wyo.
1982). Williams v. Public
Service
Commission, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988).
(Emphasis added.)
The only staff discretion afforded by the administrative code
is to make a recommendation to the presiding officer, or Council,
about whether the Complaint states a cause of action.

There is no

discretion for staff to decide the merits of a complaint.
C.

Any Decision Must Be by a "Presiding Officer" —
Third Level.

at the

Considering the order as a dismissal of the Complaint, on its
merits, as we must, it is clear that such an order must be at the
third, or charging level, and must satisfy the requirements for
such an order.
hearing.

It is clear, therefore, that POST may not deny a

POST must appoint a "presiding officer," and the

presiding officer must either deny the request and afford the
Complainant a hearing on the denial, Q£ notify Gurley to answer
and afford the Complainant a hearing on the allegations of the
Complaint.

In either event, a hearing must be afforded.

That

Cf

result is clear from a plain reading of Utah Code Ann. § 63-4 6b-3Y
subdivison (d), but if there could be any doubt it is removed by
the provision of subdivision (e) that *[a]ny notice required by
Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the information required by
Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by

22

Subsection (3)(d)(ii) of this section."

Thus any denial of a

request for adjudicative proceedings must be by a notice from the
"presiding officer" advising the "requesting party" that he or she
"may request a hearing before the agency to challenge the denial/7
and by
. . . a signed order in writing that states the
following:
(i) the decision;
(ii) the reasons for the decision;
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative
or judicial review available to the parties; and
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or
requesting a review.
Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-7 makes clear that the
purpose of the staff investigation is to make recommendations to
the presiding officer or the Council on Peace Officer Standards
and Training, and that only the presiding officer or the Council
can act on the merits of a complaint.
POINT II
STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
WERE NOT MET
POST held no hearing and took no evidence, and, moreover,
ignored the documentary evidence attached to the Complaint.

The

Order must, therefore, have been a determination that the
Complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Such an order may be

entered by a presiding officer under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l(4)(b), provided the requirements of Rule 12(b) or 56,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met.
A.

The Order Does Not Satisfy Standards for Dismissal.
The basis for the Order, if considered in light of the
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requirements of Rule 1 2 ( b ) , i s d i f f i c u l t t o g r a s p .

I t could not

be t h a t t h e Complaint f a i l e d t o a l l e g e the s i x (6) elements
s p e c i f i e d a t Utah Code Ann. § 6 3 - 4 6 b - 3 ( 3 ) ( a )
3-4).

(quoted supra, pp.

To t h e contrary, examination of t h e Complaint (R.

0054-0059) w i l l r e v e a l t h a t each and every element was a l l e g e d ,
s e r i a t i m , and in d e t a i l .

Examination of t h e Complaint w i l l a l s o

r e v e a l t h a t i t incorporated c e r t i f i e d evidence supporting i t s
a l l e g a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the f a l s e A f f i d a v i t of Gurley (R. 0088),
t h e C e r t i f i c a t e of t h e Court t h a t no c i t a t i o n was i s s u e d (R.
0106), Gurley's answers t o discovery r e q u e s t s e s t a b l i s h i n g h i s own
admission, under oath, t h a t the A f f i d a v i t was f a l s e (R. 0177-0178)
and Judge Young's Order determining t h a t Gurley did not a c t
properly.

(R. 0103.)

Judge Moffat's Order determining t h a t the

Gurley A f f i d a v i t was perjury —' was a l s o f i l e d with POST.

(R.

0216, 0235.)

POST'S investigative notes further establish that Gurley's Affidavit was perjury. The
extent to which Gurley's every utterance is infected with untruths and Gurley's willingness to
swear to anything if it suits hLs immediate purposes, is indicated by the following:
Gurley's Affidavit states that he "issued" a citation to Parker Nielson on September 13,
1990, "by mailing it to him," and that a copy of the citation was attached. The copy was signed
by Gurley, stating that "I certLfy that a copy of this citation . . . was served on the
Defendant according to law," but Gurley told POST at R. 0244 that he "had no original intent to
issue a citation to Parker Nielson" and that the phony citation "was not going to be sent."
Gurley denied at R. 0071 that he made any statement to Darrel Holden, but at R. 0246 he
admits that he had a conversation vith Holden on 9/13 by phone. The deposition of Leavitt at R.
0148-0149 also indicates that Gurley talked to Holden, contrary to his denial in his Affidavit.
Gurley denied at R. 0070 making any statement to Deputy Sheriff Dan Taylor (see Taylor's
Affidavit that Gurley threatened to arrest Plaintiff), or that he stated he would cause
Plaintiff to be arrested (R. 0065) and at % 17 of his Affidavit (R. 0092) Gurley denied saying
that he would cause Plaintiff to be cited, but admitted to POST at R. 0245 that he recalls the
conversation with Taylor and that he stated "that if he caught Parker Nielson violating the lav
he would in fact cite him." It is a coincidence, to be sure, that Gurley would single out
Parker Nielson for such a statement, six years before the event.
Gurley denied in his Affidavit (p. 4) that he released the bird, but stated to POST at
R. 0246 that in "reality the plan was to catch it, look at it and release." (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Morris apparently feels that a person should be sanguine about Gurley falsely stating
that he had been charged with a crime. Objecting to such false charges "revealed a vindictive
and prejudice [sic] perspective." Morris thus promoted Gurley to victim and "regrets the
personal trauma you have experienced as a result of trying to carry out your
responsibilities"--reminiscent of Chief Gates' defense of his white police officers in a well
publicized incident tried in Siml, California.
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The law is familiar that dismissal for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b) requires that all allegations of the
Complaint be taken as true.

An appellate court "must accept the

factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff."

Prows v. State,

(Utah 1991), c i t i n g St. Benedict's
Hospital,
State

Sorenson

Dev. Co. v. St.

811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).

Land Board,
Research

175 Adv. Rep. 6, 7

Benedict's

See also, Coleman v.

Utah

795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Lowe v.
Co.,

119 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).

Thus, stating the facts in a light most favorable to
Petitioner, as this Court must, State

v. Verde,

770 P.2d 116,

117 (Utah 1989), it must be accepted that Gurley conducted an
illegal search and seizure.-^

It must also be accepted as true

that Gurley made no arrest, obtained no warrant and issued no
citation in connection with the search and seizure.

It must then

be accepted as the fact that Gurley made no report of his activity
until after he was sued civilly, and that he then backdated an
investigative report to create a false appearance that his conduct

° This Court has recently held In State v. Smith. 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (May 22, 1992),
that, even under the "automobile exception," there must be "probable cause to believe the car
contains evidence the officer is entitled to seiee," citing Chambers v. Maronev. 399 U.S. 42,
48, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1979 (1970), but noting at n.4 that "the Utah Supreme Court, interpreting the
Utah Constitution, has propounded a considerably more narrow view of the automobile exception.
See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460, 465-71 (Utah 1990)." Even under the "traditional"
application of the automobile exception, this Court held that the following conditions must be
present to avoid the requirement of obtaining a warrant:
The truck was traveling on a public road and clearly was "readily
movable." Moreover, the vehicle contained weapons and ammunition which
Wyunn and Smith might have accessed, Helms was the only law enforcement
officer on the scent, and these events all took place in a remote area of
Utah.
No such conditions were present, on the agreed facts herein, to justify the seizure by Gurley
without a warrant. Be has so stated, under oath.

25

was pursuant to peace officer authority.

It must also be accepted

as true that Gurley refused to account for the property he had
seized as he was required to do under Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2.
Finally, and most telling, it must be accepted as the fact, as
Gurley's own sworn statements confirm (R. 0177-0178) and POST'S
investigative notes clearly establish, that he prepared a false or
simulated citation purporting to charge Petitioner with crimes
which never occurred and which were never charged, filed it with
the Third Judicial District Court for Tooele County, Utah,
attached to an affidavit falsely stating, under oath, that Gurley
"issued" the citation on or about September 13, 1990, by mailing
it to Petitioner, and that the false citation and Affidavit were
for the purpose of influencing judicial proceedings before the
Honorable David S. Young, District Judge and that the reason
Gurley did all those things was that he had animosity towards
Plaintiff and all dog trainers.

(Judge Young so ruled at R. 0101.)

Only if the those facts, and all reasonable inference to be
drawn from them, present no reasonable grounds for discipline of a
peace officer can the Order be affirmed.
B. The Order May Not be Affirmed Under Summary Judgment Standards.
If the Order was under provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l(4) permitting the "presiding officer" to grant a motion
for summary judgment, on the other hand, the requirements are
substantially the same.

That section incorporates Rule 56, Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires at (d) thereof that there
be
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an order specifiying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just.
There were no such findings and could not be in face of the
uncontroverted evidence attached to the Complaint.

Petitioner in

fact proposed findings, based entirely upon certified and
uncontroverted documents.

Petitioner's proposed finding should

now be entered by this Court.
The clear, unmistakeable basis for the Order, rather, is that
POST simply rejected the evidence presented and adopted its own
findings to the contrary —
without due process.

without evidence, without hearing and

The Order was clearly a summary judgment

proceeding, therefore, entered sua sponte. which must find its
basis or authority in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4) (quoted supra).
POINT III
DUE PROCESS WAS DENIED
Reduced to simple terms, the effect of the foregoing
provisions is to declare that the agency may not act arbitrarily.
The presiding officer may enter an order of dismissal for failure
to state a claim, or for summary judgment if there is no genuine
dispute as to the material facts, but in either event there must
be a hearing and findings adequate for review on appeal —

either

as prescribed by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or, on
dismissal, the minimum findings necessary to an informal
adjudicative proceeding.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 obligates POST

to secure due process and basic fairness:
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(a) The presiding officer shall regulate
the course of the hearing to obtain full
disclosure of relevant facts and to afford
all the parties reasonable opportunity to
present their positions.
The Supreme Court has held that "care should be taken that
[administrative] procedures should comport with standards of
fairness and due process."
Control

Commission,

Club Stanyon

Street

v. Utah

Liquor

615 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1980).

Without essaying disrespect for Messrs. Orr and Morris, we
submit that these proceedings afford a study in how judicial
officers and law enforcement officers often view the same facts
differently, and why due process requires decisions by the former
(viz., by a "presiding officer") to the exclusion of the latter.
Judges Young and Moffat saw Gurley's search and seizure without a
warrant as without probable cause and in disregard of the
statutory requirement of a request to show authority (R. 0103) and
his filing an affidavit stating otherwise to be "riddled with
untruths."

(R. 0216, 0235.)

Messrs. Morris and Orr, whose

background is police work, congratulated Gurley on the same facts
for his "dealings with citizens of this state [which] are
reflective of the confidence placed in you" and found his
"acknowledge[d] mistakes" as "nothing less than professional and
procedural in all respects."

(R. 0250.)

Those differences in

point of view, we submit, account for the Legislature's
requirement that the merits be decided by an administrative law
judge and limitation of staff to making a recommendation like a
policeman would to a regular judge.

No effort was made by Messrs.

Orr and Morris to conform to due process.
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They afforded

Petitioner no hearing.

They adopted Gurley's version of the

facts, knowing that he was an adjudicated perjurer and disregarded
certified evidence to the contrary.

They did not even identify if

their order was pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3*(d) , Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) or Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l (1). They
declined, even when request to do so was made by Petitionees
request for reconsideration and by demand for entry of findings
adopting the uncontroverted facts.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) provides that on appeal from
final agency action in formal adjudicative proceedings this Court
"shall grant relief" if "the agency has acted beyond the
jurisdiction conferred by any statute" or "has engaged in an
unlawful procedure or decision making process, or has failed to
follow prescribed procedure."

This Court has given literal effect

to those provisions, holding that it is necessary for an
administrative agency to afford "due process of law, including the
opportunity for a fair hearing."
Occupational

and Professional

(Utah App. 1989).

E.g., D.B. v. Division

Licensing,

of

779 P.2d 1145, 1148

United States District Judge David K. Winder so

concluded and found due process violated by proceedings against
two dentists which did not strictly conform with the procedures
prescribed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
Robinson,
1989).

Hansen v.

Docket No. C-89-0749W (U.S.D.C, D. Utah, decided
This Court should grant the relief provided by Utah Code

Ann. § 63~46b-16(4) by directing the adoption of Petitionees
proposed findings reciting the uncontroverted facts.
POST may not simply "duck its head," speaking figuratively,
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and ignore a bona fide complaint.

The clear purpose of the

Administrative Procedures Act, its due process provisions in
particular, is to require that such a complaint be decided on the
merits.
It is appropriate, at a time when this Court is at the
threshold of development of standards under Utah's new
Administrative Procedures Act, adopted in 1988, to recall the
admonition of Mr. Justice Black when the modern Rules of Civil
Procedure were at a similar stage of development.
Black, writing for a unanimous Court in Surowitz
Hotels

Corp.,

Mr. Justice
v.

Hilton

383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966), construed the very

provisions of Rule 12(b) at issue herein and said:
We cannot construe Rule 23 or any other one of
the Federal Rules as compelling courts to
summarily dismiss, without any answer or
argument at all, cases like this where grave
charges of fraud are shown by the record to be
based on reasonable beliefs growing out of
careful investigation. The basic purpose of the
Federal Rules is to administer justice through
fair trials, not through summary dismissals as
necessary as they may be on occasion . . . . If
rules of procedure work as they should in an
honest and fair judicial system they not only
permit, but should as nearly as possible
guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried
to an adjudication on the merits.
It is a familiar proposition that due process requires a right
to be heard before a tribunal competent by its constitution
that is, by the law of its creation —
matter.

Pennoyer

Christiansen

v. Neff,

v. Harris,

—

to pass upon the subject

95 U.S. 719, 733 (1878); accord,

163 P.2d 314, 316-17 (Utah 1945).

(p

Utah

Code Ann. § 63-46b-8^(d) secures that right in administrative
proceedings:
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The presiding officer shall afford all parties
the opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination and submit
rebuttal evidence.
In that regard, this Court plainly declared, in D.B.
Division

of Occupational

and Professional

Licensing,

v.

supra. at

1147 (Utah App. 1989) that
an opportunity to challenge the truthfulness of
testimony . . . "is even more important where the
evidence consists of the testimony of individuals
whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact,
might be perjurers or persons motivated by
malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice or
jealousy. We have formalized these protections
in the requirements of confrontation and
cross-examination. They have ancient roots."
[quoting from Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959).]
POINT IV
THE ORDER DISREGARDS DOCTRINES OF REPOSE
It is particularly egregious, we submit, that Director Orr and
his Certification Bureau Chief swept aside adjudications by Judges
Young and Moffat that Gurley acted without probable cause, with
malice, and swore untruthfully.

Messrs. Orr and Morris declared

that they had taken "evidence,* from which thev concluded that
Gurley acted with probable cause and that though he made some
"errors," his affidavit was not "riddled with untruths."

Findings

of Morris at R. 0249 thus document that he presumed to overrule
the findings of Judges Young and Moffat.
It is clear, in context, that Messrs. Orr and Morris simply
interviewed Gurley, and his counsel, accepted their explanation
and rejected the adjudications of Judges Young and Moffat.

What

was it that the Attorney General (a co-defendant with Gurley in
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related proceedings before the United States District Court) said
to Messrs. Orr and Morris that led them to those conclusions?
What was the testimony of Gurley that led them to the conclusion
that what Judge Moffat considered perjury was merely "common
errors that substantiate the fact that we are all human beings
subject to clerical debilities"?

The very purpose of the

requirement of the Administrative Procedures Act that there be a
hearing, and findings, is to require a record from which this
Court can decide if such testimony was adequate —

or if any

testimony was given.
Director Orr's acknowledgement that "when [Gurley] seized and
dismantled your pen . . . his reports reflect some errors" does
not adequately state the case —

or even come close!

Stating that

"I issued a citation," when there was none, cannot be dismissed as
a mere "error."

To state that "a copy of [the citation] is

attached," when it is the "Defendent's [sic] copy" (see lower left
hand corner of the phony citation) —

a copy, it must be observed,

which was not and could not have been "served" —

is a blunder of

such enormity that it removes any possibility that the statement
was advanced in good faith or with the care which should attend
either a statement under oath or a solemn act like charging one
with a crime, or that Messrs. Orr and Morris approached the matter
with a resolve to determine the truth.
"Some errors" does not even begin to address the problem.
Judges Young and Moffat held that Gurley acted "without probable
cause" and that his sworn statement was "riddled with untruths."
Director Orr rejected those findings out of hand and without
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taking evidence or making any findings supporting his conclusion.
We have never understood, at least until now, that the Police
Academy has appellate jurisdiction to reverse the District Court.
The Order thus disregards the doctrine collateral estoppel,
which is stated at ALI, RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS,SECOND § 29. The
Utah Court has applied the Restatement doctrine in HiJI v.
Seattle

First

National

Bank, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Feb. 24,

1992) :
Collateral estoppel, or more precisely, issue
preclusion, prevents relitigation of issues
already determined in a previous action. See
Madsen v. Borthick,
769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah
1988). Collateral estoppel applies if four
requirements are met:
First, the issue in both cases must be
identical. Second, the judgment must be
final with respect to that issue. Third,
the issue must have been fully, fairly, and
competently litigated in the first action.
Fourth, the party who is precluded from
litigating the issue must be either a party
to the first action or a privy of a party.
As the Restatement declares, at Comment b:
A party who has had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate an issue has been accorded the
elements of due process. In the absence of
circumstances suggesting the appropriateness of
allowing him to relitigate the issue, there is
no good reason for refusing to treat the issue
as settled so far as he is concerned other than
that of making the burden of litigation risk and
expense symmetrical between him and his
adversaries.
The Reporter's Note to the Restatement declares that the
"abrogation [of the mutuality rule] projected in Bernhard

of America Nafl

Trust & Sav. Ass'n,

19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892

(1942) has now gained general acceptance," citing Richards
Hodson,

26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971).
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v. Bank

v.

POINT V
THIS COURT SHOULD DIRECT APPROPRIATE RELIEF
This Court can, and we submit should, order appropriate
relief.

Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-17 makes clear that in reviewing

an administrative proceeding this Court is not limited to merely
reviewing the record and provides:
Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) . . . . (b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its
discretion as required by law;
(ii) set aside or modify agency action;
(Emphasis added.)
The evidence of Gurley's false Affidavit is uncontroverted,
and in fact admitted by him in his statement to POST.

The matter

of Gurley's conduct being unlawful and without probable cause, and
the lawfulness of Petitionees conduct, are reduced to judgment by
Judge Young.
Moffat.

The perjury of Gurley is adjudicated by Judge

The provisions of Utah Administrative Code § R728-409-5G

are mandatory:
If the alleged conduct constitutes a public
offense for which the individual has not been
previously convicted, the division shall
immediately notify the appropriate prosecutorial
authority.
Petitioner submitted an appropriate request for entry of
findings to that effect.

They are uncontrovertible.-'

This

Petitioner's proposed findings were as follows:
The following facts appear without substantial controversy herein.
1. On September 12, 1990, civil suit was initiated against Dale Gurley by a Verified
Complaint, a copy of which is attached to the Complaint herein as Exhibit "A", Partial Summary
Judgment as to which was entered against Curley by the Honorable David S. Young on June 24,
1991, a copy of which is attached to the Complaint herein as Exhibit "B*.
2. Gurley prepared an investigative report dated September 8, 1990, a copy of which is
attached to an affidavit in the civil proceedings attached to the Complaint herein as Exhibit
"C.
3. Gurley's affidavit in the civil proceedings, a copy of which is attached to the
Complaint herein as Exhibit "C, states as follows:
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Court should d i r e c t t h e entry of the requested f i n d i n g s , or d i r e c t
POST t o do s o .
The matter of perjury, already determined by t h e order of

Footnote 7 continued
I did not finalize my report on the bird trap until September 13, 1990,
vhen I was served with a Summons in this lawsuit. Prior to that date I had
made field notes of my investigation and made sketches of the bird trap. I
finalised my report on September 13, 1990, because I learned, through the
service of the Summons on me, that Plaintiff was the one who owned the bird
trap." (Emphasis added.)
4. Gurley attached a "citation" against Parker M. Nielson to the affidavit filed vith
Judge Young stating, under oath, that "I issued a citation to Plaintiff [Parker M. Nielson] on
or about September 13, 1990 by mailing it to him."
5. No citation was mailed to Parker M. Nielson and Gurley had previously stated, under
oath in Answers filed with the Court on on October 22, 1990, copies of which are attached to
the Complaint herein as Exhibit "D" (see Response to Request No. 7) that he "made no arrest of
Plaintiff, includlnR by Issuance of any citation for any alleged violation of law, on
September 8, 1990, or at any time thereafter . . ." (Emphasis added.)
6. The certificate of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Tooele County, attached to the
Complaint herein as Exhibit "E", establishes that no such "citation" was ever filed with the
Court.
7. Gurley's affidavit quoted above confirms that he prepared the citation after service
of summons on him.
8. Gurley stated in his affidavit submitted to Judge Young that "I did not know that [the
undersigned] owned the bird trap until after I was served with a Summons and Complaint," but
Gurley's own investigative report attached to his affidavit (Exhibit "C" to the Complaint
herein) states that five days earlier, on September 8, 1990 he had a conversation with Mr.
Charlie Larsen, a rancher, in which "I then said, 'Does it belong to Parker Nielson?' and he
said,'Yes, he thinks so.'"
9. Both his investigative report and his "citation" indicate that the "chukar in the trap
was released back to the wild," but Gurley stated in his affidavit (Exhibit "C" to the
Complaint herein) that "I did not release the one wild game bird that I found in the trap. I
attempted to catch it but it got out of the pen and flew away before I could do so."
10. Gurley's report acknowledges that "two net wire and chicken wire tubes were removed
. . . to shut down the trap" (Report attached to Exhibit "C" to the Complaint hereto, emphasis
added) and Gurley has acknowledged that "he dismantled [the recall pen) to render it
inoperative." (Exhibit "D" to the Complaint herein, answer to Request No. 6, emphasis added.)
11. Judge Young has concluded that Gurley's conduct "was with malice towards dog trainers
as a group or [Petitioner] in particular.'* (See Exhibit "B" to the Complaint herein at %0. )
12. Judge Young has determined that Utah Administrative Code S R608-4-3, providing that:
Any peace officer or special function officer may request persons engaged
in activities covered under these rules to exhibit any documentation
related to such activities (including, but not limited to, certificate of
registration, permit, health certificate, bill of sale, proof of
ownership), any game birds, and any device, apparatus and facility used for
activities covered under these rules.
defines the proper procedure and that "[t]he conduct of [Gurley] was therefore without
probable cause or authority . . . ." (See Exhibit "B" to the Complaint at %5.)
13. Judge Young has ruled that "[p]eace officers, including Conservation Officers such as
[Gurley], are prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. f 23-20-15 from breaking into an
enclosure such as that owned by [Parker M. Nielson]." (See Exhibit "B" to the Complaint
herein at %5.)
14. Judge Young has ruled that Gurley's conduct was "without probable cause or authority
under provisions of Utah Code Ann. $ 23-20-1 that Conservation Officers 'shall follow the same
procedure in . . . enforcement of this code, as other peace officers.'" (See Exhibit "B" to
the Complaint herein at %5.)
15. Judge Moffat has ruled, in his Order dated January 31, 1992, attached to the motion
herein dated May 13, 1992, that the Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1991, is riddled
with untruths.
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Judge Moffat, is uniquely the province and concern of the courts.
There is no need, nor is it appropriate, to remand that matter to
the agency.

This Court should refer Gurley to the appropriate

prosecutorial authority, remanding to the agency consideration of
what sanctions or limitations on peace officer certification are
necessary or appropriate pending Gurley's prosecution.
C O N C L U S I O N
There is a school of thought, we are told, that lawyers should
not descend into controversies such as this one.

There is another

school of thought, however, that lawyers are indebted to the
system, to make it work and correct abuses when they are found.
We, frankly, are committed to the latter point of view.

Only

lawyers have the skills and resources to correct peace officer
abuses such as Gurley committed in this case.
Utah State Bar Commissioner Jan Graham, Solicitor for the Utah
Attorney General's Office, stated that "a big part of my job is
defending the actions of police officers," and then had some
appropriate comments about peace officer abuses in an article
entitled What They Don't

Know, UTAH BAR JOURNAL Vol. 5 No. 6

at p. 8 (June-July, 1992).

"Utah law enforcement has worked hard

in recent years to modify practices that fuel the negative
stereotypes of abuse of police power," Ms. Graham declared, but
"right thinking leadership in law enforcement has gotten the
message and is leading the way to a more accessible, human image
for police officers" Ms. Graham continued, but "then came the
Rodney King videotape" and "all the destructive stereotypes about
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law enforcement were back on the table, unraveling years of
progress in Utah."
We can certainly agree that the creation of POST and the
enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1988, as amended
in 1991# are efforts to remove "abuse of police power."

There is

no need to look as far away as California and the Rodney King
abuses to find threats which threaten to unravel "years of
progress in Utah," however, for surely it does not require beating
with a baton to constitute a peace officer abuse, and the sworn
admissions of Gurley herein are more vivid and convincing, even if
not as dramatic, than the videotape in the Rodney King case.
Failure to discipline peace officers such as Gurley, who clearly
have abused their police power and, even worse, filed false
statements under oath to conceal their abuses threaten, far more,
the "progress [that] has been made in that all-important area:
public relations" that Ms. Graham wrote of.
This Court should therefore direct appropriate action under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 and Utah Administrative Code
§ R728-409-5G, including entry of Petitioner's proposed findings,
or direction that POST do so, and reference of Gurley to the
appropriate prosecutorial authority.
Respectfully submitted this

day of October, 1992.

*^t *

arker M. Nielson, Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT were hand delivered this ^ Z
October# 1992 to:
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Richard D. Wyss
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

(0566/630/028)
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IN THE

THIRD DISTRICT COURT

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
NIELSON, PARKER M
PLAINTIFF
VS
GURLEY, DALF

CASE NUMBER 900300302 PD
DATE 12/23/91
HONORABLE MOFFAT, RICHARD H.
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK RGB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. NIELSON, PARKER (PRO SE)
D. ATTY. SOLTIS, JOHN P

THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
THE AFFIDAVIT OF DALE GOURLEY AND DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION THERETO AND PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM, HEREBY
MAKES ITS' MINUTE ENTRY:
THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF DALE GOURLEY
DOES NOT COMPLY WITH RULE SEVEN AND ELEVEN AND IN RELIANCE
THEREON BASES ITS DECISON ON THE ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN THE
MOTION TO STRIKE AND IN PARTICULAR THE ARGUMENT SET FORTH
IN REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SAID MOTION.
IT IS CLEAR, AS POINTED OUT IN SAID DOCUMENTS, THAT THE GOURLEY
DOCUMENT IS RIDDLED WITH UNTRUTHS. SAID DOCUMENT, THEREFORE,
WILL BE STRICKEN AND SANCTIONS WILL BE AWARDED AGAINST DEFENDANT
GOURLEY IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE FAIR AND REASONABLE VALUE OF
PLAINTIFFS PROFESSIONAL TIME IN SEARCHING THE RECORDS OF THE
THIRD AND SIXTH CIRCUIT COURTS, WRITING CORRESPONDENCE TO
COUNSEL REQUESTING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND I«-*FlLINCh.AND
BRIEFING THE MOTION GRANTED HEREIN.
PLAINTIFF WILL PREPARE AN APPROPRIATE ORDER,
BY

*=-.4

#>'!>
fi'

C/C COUNSEL

J ft

THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro

Cor--, ^

-e

se

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PARKER M. NIELSON,
Plaintiff,

|
i

ORDER STRIKING AFFIDAVIT
OF DALE GURLEY AND
FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS

i

Civil No. 900 300 302

vs.
DALE GURLEY,
I

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley or
Require Compliance with Rules 7 and 11 having been submitted for
decision pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501(1)(d), Rules of
Judicial Administration, and the Court having considered
Plaintiffs motion and the documents attached thereto, Plaintiff's
memorandum in support thereof, Defendant's memorandum in
opposition dated November 25, 1991, together with the attachments
thereto, and Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike Gurley Affidavit dated December 2, 1991; and the Court
having entered its Minute Entry dated December 23, 1991, finding
(1) that the Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1990, does
not comply with Rules 7 and 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
(2) that the Gurley Affidavit dated April 18, 1990, is riddled
with untruths, and (3) the Court adopts the reasons stated by
Plaintiff in his motion, and in particular as stated in

Plaintiff's reply memorandum including that Gurley either made a
knowing misrepresentation or knowingly made a false statement that
he knew the matters stated in the affidavit to be true, for the
purpose of denying Plaintiff's rights in this litigation
wrongfully and without just cause or excuse; and,
The Court having further determined that Gurley is a "party"
who signed said Affidavit in violation of the provisions of Rule
11# Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact, and,
The Court having determined that sanctions will be awarded
against Gurley, and
The Court having considered the Affidavit of Parker M, Nielson
concerning his professional time in searching the records of the
Third Circuit Court in Tooele, Utah, and the Sixth Circuit Court
in Nephi, Utah, writing correspondence to counsel for Gurley
herein requesting voluntary compliance with requirements of Rule
11 and in filing and briefing Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of Dale Gurley or Require Compliance with Rules 7 and
11, and having considered the Affidavit of Paul T. Moxley
concerning the reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time,
and having determined that the amount of $3,289.00 is equal to the
fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time in that
regard, and
Being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
- 2 -

ORDERED,
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley

or Require Compliance with Rule 7 and 11 is granted.
2.

The Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1991, is

hereby stricken, however and wherever it may appear in these
proceedings, for the reasons that it was not signed or otherwise
certified by at least one attorney of record, as required by Rules
7 and 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because it is clear
that it is riddled with untruths.
3.

Sanctions are hereby awarded to Plaintiff and against

Defendant Dale Gurley in the amount of $3,289.00, representing the
fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time in
searching the records of the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts,
writing correspondence to counsel requesting voluntary compliance
with Rule 11 and in filing and briefing the motion granted herein.
4.

It is further ordered, pursuant to provisions of Rule

4-505(3), Rules of Judicial Administration, that this order shall
be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees
expended in collecting said amount awarded as sanctions by
execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit.
DATED this

J>/

jfaay of January, 1992.

- 3-

Address of Judgment Debtor:
Dale M. Gurley
328 North 700 East
Payson, Utah 84651
Social Security No. (unknown)

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
I hereby certify that on this 3 rd

day of January, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER STRIKING AFFIDAVIT
OF DALE GURLEY AND FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS was mailed first class,

postage prepaid to:
John P. Soltis
Reed M. Stringham III
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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PARKER M. NIELSON (2413)
655 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1150
Petitioner, pro se
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

PARKER M. NIELSON,
Petitioner,
ERRATA
vs.
Civil No. 920355-CA
DALE GURLEY, and the DIVISION OF
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND
TRAINING, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, STATE OF UTAH,
Respondents.

Notice is hereby given of the following corrections of
statutory citations in the brief of Petitioner-Appellant herein:
1.
Page 4, line 19, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should be
"§ 63-46b-313J_(d) ."
2.
Page 4, line 34, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(e)* should be
"§ 63-46b-3ill(e)."
3.
Page 5, line 9, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8" should be
"§ 63-46b-8m ."
4.
Page 6, line 9, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(e)(iii)"
should be "§ 63-46b-3(3)(e)(iii)."
5.
Page 13, line 9, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should be
"§ 63-46b-3Xll(d)."
6.
Page 16, line 21, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(3)" should
be "§ 63-46b-3(3)idl."
7.
Page 17, line 10, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should
be "§ 63-46b-3(3)(d)."
8.
Page 19, line 5, "subdivision (d) of Section 3" should be
"Section 3(3)."

9.
Page 20, line 16, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)(ii)
should be "§ 63-46b-3(3)(d)(ii)."
10. Page 20, line 24, "purpose of said § 3(d)(ii)" should be
"§ 3(3)(d)(ii)."
11. Page 21, line 9, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)(ii)"
should be "§ 63-46b-3X2±(d)(ii)."
12. Page 21, line 16, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should
be "§ 63-46b-313_l(d) ."
13. Page 22, line 28, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3" should be
"§ 63-46b-3131."
14. Page 29, line 4, "Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(d)" should be
"§ 63-46b-3!31(d)."
15. Page 30, second line from the bottom, "Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-8(d)" should be "§ 63-46b-8(l)(d)."
Request is hereby made to make the foregoing corrections by
interlineation, under the supervision of the Clerk of the Court.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of November, 1992.

/PARKER M. NIELSON
Attorney for PetitionerAppellant, pro se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ERRATA was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, this 2nd day of
November, 1992 to:
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Richard D. Wyss
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
S a l t Lake City/^CJT

84114
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